Banking on the Regime: The Global Banks Keeping Iran's Rahbar System Alive
Nov 2026WikiIran's Exclusive
The newly leaked dataset uncovered covert rosters of bank accounts registered to front companies, along with the international banks that hold them. The institutions involved are facilitating systemic sanctions evasion, effectively linking the Iranian regime to accessible financial systems and the global market.
As part of Iran's shadow banking mechanism, Rahbar companies operate alongside money exchangers and exchange houses, which establish financial front companies and open bank accounts across numerous international institutions. This structure obscures the origin of funds, streamlines transactions, and provides a means to store foreign currency. These banks are directly enabling Iranian front companies and their clients to move hundreds of millions of dollars a year into the hands of the regime and its proxies. Such facilitation of money laundering and sanctions evasion raises serious questions about the effectiveness of global anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing efforts.
The recent Rahbar data system leak reveals records of transactions, bank accounts and international bank spanning the past last two years. Most of this information had already been flagged by WikIran in earlier leaks. The following article identifies the primary financial entities from the extensive rosters contained in that data. The following banks hold the highest number of registered front company accounts disclosed in the leaked documents:
| Amount (Approx.) | Country of Bank | Bank |
|---|---|---|
| 309 | China | Ping An Bank |
| 177 | Egypt (UAE branch) | Banque Misr |
| 143 | China | Zhejiang Tailong Commercial Bank |
| 128 | China | China Construction Bank |
| 89 | China | China Everbright Bank |
| 83 | China | Bank of Shanghai |
| 76 | China | Xiamen International Bank |
| 69 | Pakistan (UAE branch) | United Bank Limited |
| 67 | UAE | First Abu Dhabi Bank |
| 62 | China | Zhejiang Mintai Commercial Bank |
All of the banks named above facilitated illicit transactions linked to Iran in several currencies, primarily the U.S. dollar, Emirati dirham and Euro. See below the top ten banks by transactions volume in each of these currencies, based on the leaked documents:
U.S Dollar
Transaction records and documents from the Rahbar system show dollar-denominated transactions totaling approximately $4.47 billion, with the following banks accounting for most of this volume:
| Bank | Approximate transaction volume |
|---|---|
| Ping An Bank | 1,142,455,098.84 |
| Zhejiang Tailong Commercial Bank | 380,741,572.90 |
| Ningbo Commerce Bank | 289,393,704.52 |
| China Everbright Bank | 264,733,424.44 |
| Xiamen International Bank | 238,064,829.69 |
| Zheijang Chouzhou Commercial Bank Co. Ltd. | 186,661,746.13 |
| China Construction Bank | 175,956,238.59 |
| Zhejiang Mintai Commercial Bank | 156,198,769.67 |
| Bank of Beijing | 155,578,613.09 |
| Zhejiang Rural Commercial Bank | 141,144,115.65 |
Emirati Dirham
Transaction records and documents from the Rahbar system show Dirham-denominated transactions totaling approximately $3.48 billion, with the following banks accounting for most of this volume:
| Bank | Approximate transaction volume (in dollar) |
|---|---|
| Emirates NBD | 1,279,278,380.00 |
| Banque Misr | 549,966,379.00 |
| First Abu Dhabi Bank | 253,145,552.00 |
| United Bank Limited | 138,234,587.00 |
| MCB Bank Limited | 95,808,899.00 |
| Bank Alfalah | 48,664,428.00 |
| Commercial Bank of Dubai | 36,469,575.00 |
| Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank | 29,511,934.00 |
| Emirates Islamic | 27,230,903.00 |
| Mashreq Bank | 24,229,573.00 |
Euro
Transaction records and documents from the Rahbar system show Euro-denominated transactions totaling approximately $688 million, with the following banks accounting for most of this volume
| Bank | Approximate transaction volume (in dollar) |
|---|---|
| Ping An Bank | 139,042,776.00 |
| Zhejiang Tailong Commercial Bank | 44,352,024.00 |
| Bank of Beijing | 32,568,726.00 |
| Bank of Shanghai | 26,286,016.00 |
| Zhejiang Mintai Commercial Bank | 25,485,535.00 |
| Xiamen International Bank | 22,463,489.00 |
| China Construction Bank | 22,038,412.00 |
| BANCO BS2 | 18,264,795.00 |
| China Everbright Bank | 17,486,227.00 |
| Bank of Jiangsu | 17,067,328.00 |
It is important to note that USD and Euro transactions processed by banks outside the United States and Europe require correspondent banks. A correspondent bank provides banking services to other banks, often across borders, enabling international transactions, settlements and payment clearing. If a correspondent bank serves a bank that knowingly or unknowingly hosts accounts for sanctioned entities, it is facilitating sanctions evasion. Potential consequences of such action include OFAC penalties, regulatory fines and reputational damage.
In addition to the banks listed above, WikIran has uncovered European and other notable entities that directly facilitated transactions on behalf of Iranian front companies within the Rahbar mechanism:
Banco BS2 SA
Banco BS2 SA is a Brazilian digital and commercial bank, primarily operating as a digital financial ecosystem. WikIran has uncovered that Banco BS2 SA has facilitated transfers totaling 16,432,778 euros (18,264,795 dollars) on behalf of illicit Rahbar-linked entities. The following bank accounts were used for these transfers:
| Account | Company |
|---|---|
| BR4471027866000010183872300B1 | BRF S.A. |
| BR52 7102 7866 0000 1000 9951 075C 1 | RUI CARNEIRO SAMPAIO SOCIEDADE INDIVIDUAL DE ADVOCACIA |
| BR54 7102 7866 0000 1038 5389 600B 1 | MARFRIG GLOBAL FOODS |
Banca Dello Stato Del Cantone Ticino
Banca Dello Stato Del Cantone Ticino is a Swiss bank that has facilitated transfers totaling 6,610,291 euros (7,271,320 dollars) on behalf of illicit Rahbar-linked entities.
| Account | Company |
|---|---|
| CH57 0076 4150 8724 7200 1 | Unicorp Seeds S.A |
Additional notable European and foreign banks identified in the materials:
| Country of Bank | Bank |
|---|---|
| Germany | SPARKASSE SUEDHOLSTEIN |
| Germany | SPARKASSE NEUSS |
| Germany | SPARKASSE NECKARTAL ODENWALD |
| Germany | LANDESSPARKASSE ZU OLDENBURG |
| Germany | BERLINER VOLKSBANK |
| Germany | VOLKSBANK RHEIN-ERFT-KOELN |
| Turkey (German branch) | ZIRAAT BANK INTERNATIONAL AG, FIL. DUISBURG |
| Germany | COMMERZBANK AG ROTTWEIL |
| Germany | POSTBANK AG |
| Italy | BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI SIENA S.P.A. |
| Italy | BPER BANCA SPA, FILIALE DI PIANORO |
| Italy | BPER-BANCA POPOLARE EMILIA ROMAGNA |
| Germany | HYPOBANK VORALBEG |
| Italy | INTESA SANPAOLO |
| Spain | CAJA RURAL DE NAVARA |
| Thailand | LAND AND HOUSES BANK PUBLIC COMPANY LIMITED |
| Italy | CREDEM-CREDITO EMILIANO |
| Netherlands | ABN AMRO BANK N.V. |
One noteworthy bank listed above is Zhejiang Chouzhou Commercial Bank (ZCCB), which was recently the subject of a Wall Street Journal article, describing ZCCB as a bank heavily involved in trade with sanctioned entities in Russia and Iran. The report cited research conducted by TRM Labs, which used WikIran to identify approximately 240 accounts held at ZCCB (out of 900 total across Chinese banks).
Below, we add 36 newly identified accounts of Iranian entities held at ZCCB, which boldly disputed the accuracy of the information published on WikIran:
| Company Name | Account number | Currency |
|---|---|---|
| AGRODRAGON CO. LTD. | NRA18801002010590002059 | USD |
| ASIA SOFTWARE SERVICES LIMITED | NRA18809142010500031655 | USD |
| BLISS STAR TRADING LLC | NRA56567142010500005158 | USD |
| BUILDWISE TRADING LIMITED | NRA56567002010590002984 | USD |
| CLEAR SKY COMPANY LIMITED | NRA15702002010590035417 | USD |
| ERMES TRADING LIMITED | NRA18809002010590013844 | USD |
| GLOBAL CONNECT LIMITED | NRA56567142010500015852 | USD |
| GLOPIV SUPPLY CHAIN PTE.LTD | NRA15628142010500013833 | USD |
| GOLDEN MIST PTE. LTD | NRA56504142010500015856 | USD |
| HALPAM INTERNATIONAL LIMITED | NRA56504142010500019916 | USD |
| HK RELIANT LIMITED | NRA56567142010500007751 | USD |
| INTL SMART HK LIMITED | NRA56567142010500005979 | USD |
| INTL SMART HK LIMITED | NRA56567382010500003973 | EUR |
| J AND J MOTOR (H.K) LIMITED | NRA18701142010500003117 | USD |
| KGT TRADING LIMITED | NRA56567142010500015895 | USD |
| LANDSH TRADE LIMITED | NRA56504382010500005716 | EUR |
| LUNA EB LIMITED | NRA56567142010500018006 | USD |
| LUOYANG HUIEN METAL PRODUCT CO., LTD | NRA15702002010590013281 | USD |
| MEIZI CO., LIMITED | NRA56567002010590001721 | USD |
| MIT BIT TRADE LIMITED | NRA56506142010500000614 | USD |
| QINGDAO JIERUIXIN INDUSTRIES CO., LIMITED | OSA11012728077601 | USD |
| RELIANCE COMMERCE LIMITED | NRA68602002010590000336 | USD |
| RESP SERVICES FZCO | NRA56567142010500015275 | USD |
| RISESUN INTERNATIONAL TRADING (SHANGHAI) CO.,LTD | 1.56021E+19 | USD |
| SANTANEX TRADE LIMITED | NRA56506142010500000499 | USD |
| SHAANXIT TEFICO PETROLEOM MACHICAL AND ELECTRIC NEW TECHNOLOGY CO LTD | 5.6507E+19 | USD |
| SHENGLIYONG TRADING COMPANY LIMITED | NRA56504002010590000106 | USD |
| SHENZHEN AOMINGYANG ELECTRONIC CO.,LTD. | NRA17601002010590002658 | USD |
| SISU PRIME LIMITED | NRA31050101100100000327 | EUR |
| STANDARD COMMERCE LIMITED | NRA68602002010590000328 | USD |
| SUPREME TRADE LIMITED | NRA56567142010500015742 | USD |
| WUHAN FRIENDSHIP NEW TECH CO., LTD | 1.8801E+19 | USD |
| XINLIYI WORLD BUSINESS CO. LIMITED | NRA56504382010500005518 | EUR |
| XINYI INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO., LIMITED | NRA56567002010590001705 | USD |
| YALUO LIMITED | NRA56504142010500020070 | USD |
| ZANGULU LIMITED | NRA56504002010590000866 | EUR |
WikIran calls on the AML and compliance officers at ZCCB to review the following table, which lists reference numbers, dates and exact amounts transferred via ZCCB during 2025 – Dispute this.

Download the full file here
Overall, the enormous scale of USE and Euro transactions involving banks named in the newly Rahbar dataset, as well as entities exposed in previous leaks, should be a serious concern for all financial institutions, particularly Western ones. The leaked material confirms what was already known: these financial institutions continue to serve as a lifeline for networks laundering proceeds from illicit Iranian trade.
By failing to conduct adequate enhanced due diligence, sanctions screening, transaction monitoring and suspicious activity reporting, they appear to breach international sanctions and AML/CFT requirements and, in some cases, support networks linked to terrorism.
Correspondent banks that settled transfers or acted as intermediaries also appear to have failed to properly vet respondent banks, neglecting KYC controls that should identify a client’s true identity and compliance risk.
The implications for regulators and the global financial system are clear: banks implicated in servicing entities linked to the Iranian Rahbar system are not merely passively involved, they are undermining global efforts to combat sanctions evasion, money laundering and terrorist financing. These institutions should immediately audit all clients linked to high-risk jurisdictions, strengthen sanctions screening and EDD, and report suspicious activity without delay. Failure to do so may result in severe legal consequences, substantial fines, and lasting reputational harm.
WikIran’s exposure continues to underscore a broader concern: Iranian front institutions are increasingly penetrating the global financial system. Addressing this requires decisive action by banks, regulators and law enforcement. The cost of inaction is heightened global financial and security risk, and continued exploitation by the Iranian regime.