Waves of Illusion: How Sanctioned Iran Deceives the Entire Maritime Community

A deep dive into 177 vessels identified in the HMS Trading and PDECO database reveals how Iran exploits open registries, sanctioned ships, and identity manipulation to deceive the global maritime community and continue exporting oil despite international sanctions.

In the latest HMS Trading and PDECO database, we uncovered 177 vessels that have illicitly exported sanctioned Iranian oil. The Iranian Regime has built an intricate maritime infrastructure comprising hundreds of shipping companies, port agents and vessels. This system enables Iran to quickly activate vessels through multiple entities within an expansive network, and Iran is crucially dependent on it for its oil export.

This article takes a closer look at which vessels enabled HMS Trading and PDECO to conduct their export operations, as well as provides several examples of the deceptive tactics used to illegally export Iranian oil.

Open Registries – A Widely-Used Loophole:

As demonstrated in the graph above, HMS and PDECO predominantly use vessels registered under the Panamanian flag. Other frequently used registries are Gabon, Liberia and Palau. All these registries share a common characteristic: they are open registries, also known as “flags of Convenience”.

A “flag of convenience” is a registry that allows international shipowners to register a vessel in the registry without being citizens or residents of the flag state. This system results in much lower levels of oversight by the flag registries, making it desirable for the Iranians to exploit in their sanctions evading efforts.

Sanctioned Vessels – Flagrant Sanctions Violations:

Although U.S. Treasury sanctions are considered a powerful tool in combating the use of vessels for illegal Iranian oil exports, Iran even employs sanctioned vessels. In the recent leak, 110 sanctioned vessels have been identified - a flagrant sanction violation, as the vessels (and thereby anyone supporting them) continue facilitating illegal Iranian oil export. Attached below is a list of the sanctioned vessels identified in the HMS and PDECO data leak:

Previously Exposed on WikIran

Many of the vessels in the recently leaked data have previously been identified and exposed by WikIran in several contexts, specifically in contexts tied to the Iranian Security Bodies. This further demonstrates that the Iranian Shadow Fleet network functions as a web of vessels serving numerous Iranian entities, rather than being tied to a single organization. Attached below is a list of vessels that been previously exposed by WikIran in connections with Iranian Security Bodies:

The following examples demonstrate various deceptive techniques involving vessels used by HMS Trading and PDECO:

1. Vessel Identity Manipulation of a Sanctioned Vessel

WikIran has previously exposed the vessel URANUS (IMO: 9307633) for its affiliation with AFGS front company, Sepehr Energy Jahan. Prior to this exposure, in September 2024, the U.S. Treasury had already sanctioned the vessel (previously known as ETERNAL SUCCES) for facilitating the exports of oil by the IRGc-QF. Despite these regulatory actions and WikIran exposure, the vessel URANUS did not cease its illegal sanction evading activities.

On January 19, 2025, the vessel URANUS loaded nearly 2 million barrels of Iranian oil at Kharg Island, with an approximate value of $160 million. Attached below is the vessel’s Bill of Lading, which documents the shipper as NIOC and the destination port as Dalian, China. Additionally, it mentions that the oil cargo can be unloaded to the order of company Petro Point Limited.

It is noteworthy that the vessel URANUS’ flag registry is listed as St. Maarten:

The flag registry of St. Maarten is fictitious and known to be easily accessible to vessels operating as part of the Iranian Shadow Fleet. Interestingly, both St. Maarten and the Dutch government have denied the existence of such a flag registry.

2. Avoiding Authorities During an STS Operation

Apart from using questionable flag registries, HMS and PDECO vessels employ several other common deceptive techniques to keep their illegal export covert. The following document outlines the STS procedure between two vessels - MT LUNA PRIME, IMO 9174220 and MT PRIYA, IMO 9233349). Both of these vessels were designated by the U.S. Treasury in 2024. The Joint Plan of Operations document indicates that the date of the STS operation was March 15, 2025, meaning that both vessels had already been designated at the time of the operation.

Within the document, it is explicitly stated that if any "Coast Guards/Navy/any suspicious craft alongside" appear, both vessels are instructed to not permit them on board. This provision indicates that the involved parties were aware of their unlawful activities and avoiding authorities.

The Iranian Shadow Fleet Network includes hundreds of vessels and facilitators used by Iranian Security Bodies and, as demonstrated above, HMS Trading and PDECO. These vessels are used through various deceptive tactics, and therefore, relevant entities and authorities should conduct thorough due diligence, properly execute research and perform comprehensive background checks.

Additionally, open flag registries must consider the possibility of sanctioned Iranian or Iranian-affiliated companies using or registering vessels with their flag, thereby associating them with illegal oil exports.

It is clear that the U.S. Naval Blockade on the Strait of Hormuz has proven effective in deterring illegal Iranian oil export initiatives. WikIran calls on U.S authorities and other relevant entities to continue investigating these aforementioned deceptive tactics and make note of all the entities listed in this article in order to strengthen the expansive economic pressure efforts.