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144 results
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Waves of Illusion: How Sanctioned Iran Deceives the Entire Maritime CommunitySep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - A deep dive into 177 vessels identified in the HMS Trading and PDECO database reveals how Iran exploits open registries, sanctioned ships, and identity manipulation to deceive the global maritime community and continue exporting oil despite international sanctions. In the latest HMS Trading and PDECO database, we uncovered 177 vessels that have illicitly exported sanctioned Iranian oil. The Iranian Regime has built an intricate maritime infrastructure comprising hundreds of shipping companies, port agents and vessels. This system enables Iran to quickly activate vessels through multiple entities within an expansive network, and Iran is crucially dependent on it for its oil export. This article takes a closer look at which vessels enabled HMS Trading and PDECO to conduct their export operations, as well as provides several examples of the deceptive tactics used to illegally export Iranian oil. Open Registries – A Widely-Used Loophole: ![none](/files/article
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Oops! He did it Again: Nepo-baby Ehsan Tahayyori’s Unsuccessful Dealings with Bank Shahr’s Sanctions Evasion NetworkSep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - Ehsan Tahayyori, previously exposed for running one of Iran's largest exchange houses, leveraged aliases and front companies to pivot into the shipping industry through HMS Trading, only to see his venture collapse amid failed joint ventures and mortgage defaults, leaving a trail of shell companies that continue to operate. Ehsan Tahayyori and his exchange house were widely exposed on WikIran back in 2022. Yet, some professional sanctions evaders won’t quit. Ehsan Tahayyori is the owner of Arz-Iran, also known as Tahayyori Guarantee Society, an exchange house that used to be one of Iran’s largest and used to funnel billions of USD each year, much of which originated from petroleum and petrochemical sales abroad. Tahayyori, son of late IRGC commander Shamsali Tahayyori, grew up in a wealthy family in Lavasan province, Teheran, surrounded by luxurious cars and private jets. Following his father’s death, Tahayyori jr. worked hard to grow t
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Fishy Business: Exposing the Iranian Oil Brokers disguised as Fish TradersSep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - From "salted fish" to oil smuggling: How a Dubai trading license meant for fish was used to conceal a multi-million-dollar Iranian crude exporting operation. WikIran is exposing oil broker Hamed Kachoee and the network he created to facilitate Iranian oil export. In our previous articles, we examined some of the leading oil brokers in the HMS Trading database, Reza Dindar and Ali Bayandarian. Another prominent figure that shares similar characteristics is Hamed Kachoee. Meet Hamed Kachoee: A Shadow Amongst the Shadows Hamed Mohamed Bagher Kachoee (sometimes spelled Kachouei, Kachoei or Kachoie), born in 1976, is an Iranian National (Passport no. P96602177) and a UAE resident (ID no. 784197615250723). While he may not be as famous a sanctions-buster as his counterparts previously exposed on WikIran, his prominence is well established by the attention his front company, Unique Performance General Trading LLC, drew from the U.S. Treasury in 2023. Dubai-based **Un
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Ali Bayandarian Presents: Whack-a-Mole, the Sanctions EditionSep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - Despite being blacklisted in 2020 and exposed on WikIran in the past, Ali Bayandarian has continued orchestrating Iran's oil trade through a rotating cast of front companies— that exposes the loopholes allowing sanctioned actors to operate within the global financial system. As mentioned in our previous article, companies such as HMS and PDECO typically engage oil brokers who manage vast networks of associated entities, all operating in coordination to support Iran's financial operations under sanctions. Based on our newest HMS Trading database, our team has once again identified oil broker Ali Bayandarian as a key figure in facilitating Iran's ability to operate under sanctions and maintain the sale and export of oil and petroleum products. The following document contains a list of brokers that work with PDECO, including Bayandarian: none Ali Bayandarian (also referred to as Ali Bayandorian), 53,
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The Dindar Dossier: The Broker Who Believed He Was UntouchableSep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - Reza Dindar, an Iranian Turkish dual national, has become the unlikely poster child of a sprawling sanctions evasion network. Using front companies around the world, Dindar funneled US origin military grade sonar parts to Iran and laundered oil and petrochemical revenues for the Iranian regime. In our previous articles, we examined the infrastructure of HMS Trading and Petro Delta Energy Co. (PDECO), which enables the Iranian Shahr Bank to transfer foreign currency funds from oil and petrochemical sales back to Iran through a network of front companies and intermediaries. One of those intermediaries is Iranian oil Broker Reza Dindar. Booking The Detainee Dindar, son of Ali Akbar and Zahra, sometimes referred to as Renda Dindar, was born in 1981 in Karaj, Iran. Dindar is an Iranian dual-national (Iranian passport no. U52468771) who also holds a Turkish passport (no. U23860691). none Dindar’s name recently surface
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Up Front Payment: Unraveling the Multi-Layered Clandestine Infrastructure of Iranian Front Companies In the UAESep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran uses internal documents from *HMS Trading FZE* and *Petro Delta Energy Co*. to map out the complex infrastructure orchestrated by Bank Shahr’s Rahbar system in the UAE. Dive in with us as we unmask the fronts created by the Iranian Shadow Banking Mechanism in this article and the next to follow. Lax-regulation jurisdictions are a fertile ground for all kinds of illicit financial shenanigans, especially money-laundering operations. That’s why approximately 50% of Iranian Shadow Banking activities are conducted on UAE soil. This translates to tens of billions of dollars every year that ends up accessible to the regime, later used to oppress their own people and project terror around the globe. To facilitate these sanction-busting operations and bring them up to scale, a rather sophisticated mechanism has evolved. Its primary goal is to conceal Iranian shady dealings abroad, and it utilized a few types of entities to do so. The materials from the recent le
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Partners in Crime: The UAE-Iran Financial SituationshipAug 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran is exposing the sheer scale of the UAE-Iran illicit financial ties, as revealed in a new leak from the local branch of Bank Shahr’s Rahbar system – *HMS Trading FZE* and *Petro Delta Energy Co*. The materials offer the most comprehensive look yet into the heart of sanction-evasion operations at the primary hub of the Iranian Shadow Banking mechanism. The United Arab Emirates has emerged as one of the most significant financial hubs for the Iranian regime, despite mounting international sanctions. A vast network of front companies operating withing the UAE exploits the country’s sophisticated financial infrastructure and lax regulatory environment to move funds and process transactions on behalf of Iran. This relationship exists in stark contrast to the very real military threats the UAE has faced from Iran. While Iran targeted the UAE with missiles and drones for months, demonstrating a direct threat to Emirati lives and sovereignty, Iranian funds cont
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Made in China: China's Supply Lines to Iran's Missile FacilitiesJun 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - Leaked documents from *Khorasan Powder Metallurgy Company (KPMC)* exposes the extant of Chinese involvement in Iranian ballistic missile program. The leaked materials we have obtained demonstrate that China, once again, is the primary enabler in MODAFL’s armament’s efforts. Most notably, KPMC purchases lab equipment from Chinese companies that is crucial for the aluminum powder production line. As explained in previous articles, aluminum powder is a dual-use substance, that serves as a key ingredient in solid rocket fuel production. Presented below is a letter by KPMC’s CEO, Mohammad Hussein Zabol Abbasi, addressed to the Head of Energy and Materials Affairs at the Center for Cooperation on Change and Progress, in the Office of the Presidency. Zabol Abbasi claims that a specific cooling pump, acquired from China, is among the equipment items that constitute a critical bottleneck. He writes that it is urgently required in order to maintain the operation of the a
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The Proof Is in the Powder: KPMC, MODAFL's aluminum powder contractor, deceives its global customers and suppliersJun 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran exposes KPMC, an Iranian aluminum powder manufacturer serving as MODAFL's go-to supplier for ballistic missile solid-fuel, while misleading international customers into believing it operates a legitimate commercial business, exposing both buyers and sellers to regulatory actions and sanctions. Khorasan Powder Metallurgy Engineering and Designing Company (KPMC) was established in the early 1990s by engineer Hossein Zabol Abbasi in the Khorasan region of Iran. What began as a modest powder metallurgy venture has evolved into a multifaceted powder producer with over 30 years of industry experience. none KPMC operates as a privately held limited liability company, predominantly owned and managed by the Zabol Abbasi family. Hossein Zabol Abbasi currently serves as Chairman of the Board of Directors, while his son Mohammed Hossein Zabol Abbasi golds the position of the CEO, while Hossien currently serve
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Breaking The Bank: Exposing Banks Facilitating Iranian Sanctions Evasion and Money Laundering for GDCP and Nosazan KavehJun 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - Based on recently leaked databases, WikIran has identified several banks providing financial services to Iranian front companies and clients associated with two Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) front companies: GDCP and Nosazan Kaveh. Whether knowingly or not, these banks have facilitated international sanctions evasion and enabled money laundering that directly benefitted the IRGC. The disclosures illuminate hidden relationships between banking institutions and entities tied to Iran’s IRGC, raising serious questions about the effectiveness of anti-money laundering (AML) regulations. Going over the leaked documents, it appears that banks across the globe, from China to the UAE, are providing key financial services to front companies and clients of GDCP and Nosazan Kaveh, the trading arms of Iran's IRGC. This association enables sanctions evasion, money laundering and terror financing, which could lead to severe legal and financial consequences for the
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