WikiIran
The Great Oil Masquerade: A deep dive into Iran's Brazen Oil Rebranding Operations
WikiIran's Exclusive
By
Editorial
/
June 2025

Iran's exports of petroleum and petroleum products, despite being sanctioned, rely highly on sophisticated methods for "rebranding" these goods. The country's most skilled operatives have devised ingenious ways to circumvent international sanctions, as our following investigations uncovers.

pl1

Wikiran has previously exposed the process of rebranding petroleum products at the VERASCO Terminal at Hamriyah, the UAE. For more information, please refer to our article

The two methods presented here, while not exclusive to the Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS) Oil and Derivatives Command and its trading arm, Sepehr Energy Jahan (SEJ), are complex and impressive in their scope.

The First method: Rebranding by Ship-to-Ship (STS) transfer

This is the primary technique employed by SEJ to rebrand oil/ This process relies on two key pillars: the ship-to-ship transfer of Iranian crude oil and the fabrication of shipping documents that support the claim of a different origin, almost exclusively "Malaysian Origin". Two Malaysian marine service companies, have been identified as foreign accomplices in these rebranding efforts:

  1. MR Marine Straits Services SDN BHD, through its subsidiary Prime Marine Services - the company fabricated documents for the Iranian AFGS in at least seven different shipments since July 2023.

pl1

  1. Trans Artic Global Marine Services SDN BHD - the company fabricated documents for the Iranian AFGS in at least two different shipments since July 2023.

The Second method: Rebranding by Omission

The second method involves shipping the oil directly to its destination while simply labeling it as "Crude Oil". We’ll elaborate further in the article.

An Explanation by Example of the "Rebranding by a ship to ship transfer" process – MT RITI

This approach is exemplified by the case of MT RITI:

  1. The process begins with SEJ organizing a vessel to carry their crude oil, which is then trasferred to a second vessel via STS.

pl1 A signed contract from June 2023 between the Owners of the vessel MT Queen Sere and Tetis Global, SEJ’s shipping front, reveals the willingness to load Iranian Crude oil, either by STS or directly at a terminal.

pl1 pl1 The MT RITI Notice of Readiness (NOR) for loading the oil shows that MT RITI waited for 7.4 days next to Nipah, Indonesia, before the STS transfer took place.

  1. A Ship-to-Ship (STS) transfer is organized.

pl1

A STS operation at Nipah, Indonesia, conducted on August 7th, 2023. Mother Vessel (MV) is Queen Sere, while Daughter Vessel (DV) is MT RITI. The MT RITI will remain the only relevant vessel for the inspected shipment.

  1. New shipping documents, including a bill of lading (BOL) and a certificate of origin (COO), are then issued for the loading vessel (Daughter Vessel – DV) by one of the mentioned marine services companies. These documents falsely claim that the oil is of Malaysian origin, with Tompok Utara listed as the loading port.

pl1 A new Bill of Lading issued for MT RITI by Malaysia-based “Prime Marine Services”. The oil then commences its journey of rebranding.

pl1 The new falsified bill of lading, showing the oil is of Malay origin and Tompok Utara as the port of loading.

pl1 A fabricated document proving MT RITI loaded oil at Tampok Utara

pl1 The first fabricated Certificate of Origin issued for the oil on board MT RITI by Prime Marine Services, part of the MR Marine Straits Services SDN BHD group.

pl1 MT RITI’s Captain even protested for the lack of basic shipping documents, despite loading crude oil worth approximately $50 million.

  1. The Final step involves the daughter vessel and its cargo visiting a well-known international inspection company, such as Saybolt or CCIC, to "certify" the oil's origin as Malaysian.

pl1 Dutch Inspection giant Saybolt inspected the cargo and granted it the title “Malaysian Light Crude Oil", despite raising significant doubts due to the lack of basic shipping documents.

pl1 This inspection report by Saybolt, certifying the oil is Malay, was enough for potential customers. A wise woman once said: “There are none so blind as those who will not see".

Using this method, MR Marine Straits Services SDN BHD, through Prime Marine Services, has successfully but falsely claimed AFGS-owned Iranian crude oil is of Malay origin on at least seven instances:

• MT RITI – August 2023

• MT Nireus – August 2023

• MT Sharp Ocean – August 2023

• MT Duplic Dynamic – July 2023

• MT Cathay Kirin – August 2023

• MT Lady Sofia – July 2023

• MT Spar – July 2023

Another company from Malaysia, Trans Artic Global Marine Services SDN BHD, has also been involved in rebranding AFGS oil as Malaysian, in the following instances:

• MT Atilan – April 2024

• MT Boreas – February 2024

pl1 pl1

Furthermore, we believe that the Chinese-owned China Certification & Inspection Group (CCIC group) has knowingly engaged in schemes to rebrand Iranian oil. In one recorded case, CCIC's Singapore branch, CCIC Singapore PTE LTD, inspected NITC-owned, Iranian-flagged MT Sevda after discharging its Iranian oil, referred to as “Light Blend Crude Oil”, to MT Spar.

pl1 pl1

In many cases, such as with MT Anthea, CCIC's Singapore branch certified the oil as simply “Crude Oil” or “Malaysian Heavy Crude Oil”, with the Shandong branch accepting these assessments.

pl1 pl1 Almost identical signed ullage reports by CCIC's Singapore branch for the cargo of MT Anthea. Classified as “Crude Oil” in one document and as “Malaysian Heavy Crude Oil” in the other.

pl1 A Certificate of Quality (COQ) issued by CCIC Shandong for the same shipment by MT Anthea, prior to discharge.

An Explanation by Example of the "Rebranding by omission" process – MT Artura

The "Rebranding by omission" process is exemplified by the case of MT Artura (sometimes referred to as "ATR"), where Iranian crude oil was loaded at Kharg Island and discharged at Dongjiakou, China, without any mention of its Origin. It is noteworthy that sometimes the Chinese port did not care about the cargo's origin, as long as it didn't say "Iran".

pl1 Official NIOC documents indicate that MT Artura loaded Iranian crude oil at Kharg Island on August 19th, 2023.

pl1 MT Artura's Notice of Readiness to discharge "Crude Oil" at Dongjiakou China, on December 11th, signed by Qingdao Port International Logistics Company. The document was accepted by the port operators despite the lack of information on the oil's origin.

pl1 MT Artura's "Laytime Statement of Fact" noting its discharge protocol of "crude oil" at Dongjiakou port, China.

WikIran hopes that revealing the methods used by the Islamic Republic and its accomplices in oil smuggling will prevent them from continuing to do so, thereby decreasing funding for malign activities such as proliferation, war-mongering and oppression of the Iranian people.