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148 results
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Tea Party: The Network of British Dual Nationals Exploiting Their Passports for Iranian Sanction EvasionSep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran identified a network of British nationals facilitating Iranian Shadow Banking operations in the UAE, exploiting their citizenship to help Iran evade international sanctions and broker illicit oil deals. In our previous articles, we revealed prominent elements of the Iranian Shadow Banking Mechanism in the UAE – utilized by the regime to defy international sanctions and establish trade relationships with the legitimate international financial system. As demonstrated in the HMS Trading database, this mechanism relies heavily on networks of front companies and those who manage them. Typically, generic front companies are operated by a single money mule manager who also serves as sole shareholder. Such mules are recruited deliberately for their foreign nationality, which enables them to register companies and transfer funds w
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Money Mules: The Overlooked Backbone of The Iranian Shadow Banking Mechanism and Illicit Oil TradeSep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - The HMS and PDECO leak unveils a fleet of money mules located in the UAE, used by the Iranian Shadow Banking Mechanism to transfer illicit funds and bypass sanctions undetected. Over the past years, HMS Trading and Petro Delta Energy Co. (PDECO) have built an extensive commercial network designed to export Iranian oil while remaining invisible to regulators. At its core are thousands of front companies, entities that merely exist on paper. Their purpose is to serve as “legitimate” cover for Iranian activities – legal entities to sign contracts, intermediaries for oil shipments and replaceable bank accounts for money transfers that would otherwise be blocked by international sanctions. To keep this web of deception credible, the Iranian Shadow Banking mechanism deliberately recruits easily accessible foreign nationals, often referred to as ‘mules’ or ‘money mules’, to serve as managers, directors, or representatives of front companies. These individuals are hire
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Follow the Money: How Major Global Banks Are Quietly Financing the Iranian RegimeSep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran has uncovered a sprawling financial web that funnels illicit Iranian oil revenue around the globe, primarily through major American and European institutions. The data show that dozens of banks worldwide – unknowingly or not – process transactions that enable systemic sanction evasion, connecting the Iranian Regime to the global financial system. To ensure the successful flow of Iranian oil revenue through the global financial system, front companies register bank accounts in lax regulation jurisdictions. The accounts are used to obscure the origin of funds and conduct illicit transactions on behalf of the Iranian Shadow Banking mechanism. These banking relationships have allowed HMS Trading, Petro Delta Energy Co. (PDECO) and their clients to transfer hundreds of millions of dollars that ultimately end up in the hands of the Iranian regime. Following WikIran’s in-depth analysis of the leaked information, many leading financial institutes have been iden
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The Sea Princess: Ashjan Al Morzooqi Has a Dark Fleet of Her OwnSep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - Meet Ashjan Al Marzooqi, the Al Marzooqi family member behind Master Crest Shipping Line, a Marshall Islands-based company that finances and legally controls vessels in Iran's shadow fleet, seizing them when debts go unpaid. As outlined in our previous article the Al Marzooqi family is essential to the operation of Bank Shahr’s export front networks (PDECO and HMS Trading). The Al Marzooqi family handles various responsibilities related to this business: legal, financial, and shipping matters. The shipping component is largely managed by one notable member of the family: Ashjan Omar Mohamed Zubaeer Al Marzooqi. Ashjan is the registered owner of Marshall Islands-based Master Crest Shipping Line Inc., a company used to legally control and provide mortgages for vessels that make upIran’s shadow fleet. none ![none](/files/articles/6d28
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Waves of Illusion: How Sanctioned Iran Deceives the Entire Maritime CommunitySep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - A deep dive into 177 vessels identified in the HMS Trading and PDECO database reveals how Iran exploits open registries, sanctioned ships, and identity manipulation to deceive the global maritime community and continue exporting oil despite international sanctions. In the latest HMS Trading and PDECO database, we uncovered 177 vessels that have illicitly exported sanctioned Iranian oil. The Iranian Regime has built an intricate maritime infrastructure comprising hundreds of shipping companies, port agents and vessels. This system enables Iran to quickly activate vessels through multiple entities within an expansive network, and Iran is crucially dependent on it for its oil export. This article takes a closer look at which vessels enabled HMS Trading and PDECO to conduct their export operations, as well as provides several examples of the deceptive tactics used to illegally export Iranian oil. Open Registries – A Widely-Used Loophole: ![none](/files/article
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Oops! He did it Again: Nepo-baby Ehsan Tahayyori’s Unsuccessful Dealings with Bank Shahr’s Sanctions Evasion NetworkSep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - Ehsan Tahayyori, previously exposed for running one of Iran's largest exchange houses, leveraged aliases and front companies to pivot into the shipping industry through HMS Trading, only to see his venture collapse amid failed joint ventures and mortgage defaults, leaving a trail of shell companies that continue to operate. Ehsan Tahayyori and his exchange house were widely exposed on WikIran back in 2022. Yet, some professional sanctions evaders won’t quit. Ehsan Tahayyori is the owner of Arz-Iran, also known as Tahayyori Guarantee Society, an exchange house that used to be one of Iran’s largest and used to funnel billions of USD each year, much of which originated from petroleum and petrochemical sales abroad. Tahayyori, son of late IRGC commander Shamsali Tahayyori, grew up in a wealthy family in Lavasan province, Teheran, surrounded by luxurious cars and private jets. Following his father’s death, Tahayyori jr. worked hard to grow t
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Fishy Business: Exposing the Iranian Oil Brokers disguised as Fish TradersSep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - From "salted fish" to oil smuggling: How a Dubai trading license meant for fish was used to conceal a multi-million-dollar Iranian crude exporting operation. WikIran is exposing oil broker Hamed Kachoee and the network he created to facilitate Iranian oil export. In our previous articles, we examined some of the leading oil brokers in the HMS Trading database, Reza Dindar and Ali Bayandarian. Another prominent figure that shares similar characteristics is Hamed Kachoee. Meet Hamed Kachoee: A Shadow Amongst the Shadows Hamed Mohamed Bagher Kachoee (sometimes spelled Kachouei, Kachoei or Kachoie), born in 1976, is an Iranian National (Passport no. P96602177) and a UAE resident (ID no. 784197615250723). While he may not be as famous a sanctions-buster as his counterparts previously exposed on WikIran, his prominence is well established by the attention his front company, Unique Performance General Trading LLC, drew from the U.S. Treasury in 2023. Dubai-based **Un
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Ali Bayandarian Presents: Whack-a-Mole, the Sanctions EditionSep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - Despite being blacklisted in 2020 and exposed on WikIran in the past, Ali Bayandarian has continued orchestrating Iran's oil trade through a rotating cast of front companies— that exposes the loopholes allowing sanctioned actors to operate within the global financial system. As mentioned in our previous article, companies such as HMS and PDECO typically engage oil brokers who manage vast networks of associated entities, all operating in coordination to support Iran's financial operations under sanctions. Based on our newest HMS Trading database, our team has once again identified oil broker Ali Bayandarian as a key figure in facilitating Iran's ability to operate under sanctions and maintain the sale and export of oil and petroleum products. The following document contains a list of brokers that work with PDECO, including Bayandarian: none Ali Bayandarian (also referred to as Ali Bayandorian), 53,
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The Dindar Dossier: The Broker Who Believed He Was UntouchableSep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - Reza Dindar, an Iranian Turkish dual national, has become the unlikely poster child of a sprawling sanctions evasion network. Using front companies around the world, Dindar funneled US origin military grade sonar parts to Iran and laundered oil and petrochemical revenues for the Iranian regime. In our previous articles, we examined the infrastructure of HMS Trading and Petro Delta Energy Co. (PDECO), which enables the Iranian Shahr Bank to transfer foreign currency funds from oil and petrochemical sales back to Iran through a network of front companies and intermediaries. One of those intermediaries is Iranian oil Broker Reza Dindar. Booking The Detainee Dindar, son of Ali Akbar and Zahra, sometimes referred to as Renda Dindar, was born in 1981 in Karaj, Iran. Dindar is an Iranian dual-national (Iranian passport no. U52468771) who also holds a Turkish passport (no. U23860691). none Dindar’s name recently surface
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Up Front Payment: Unraveling the Multi-Layered Clandestine Infrastructure of Iranian Front Companies In the UAESep 2026

WikiIran's Exclusive - WikIran uses internal documents from *HMS Trading FZE* and *Petro Delta Energy Co*. to map out the complex infrastructure orchestrated by Bank Shahr’s Rahbar system in the UAE. Dive in with us as we unmask the fronts created by the Iranian Shadow Banking Mechanism in this article and the next to follow. Lax-regulation jurisdictions are a fertile ground for all kinds of illicit financial shenanigans, especially money-laundering operations. That’s why approximately 50% of Iranian Shadow Banking activities are conducted on UAE soil. This translates to tens of billions of dollars every year that ends up accessible to the regime, later used to oppress their own people and project terror around the globe. To facilitate these sanction-busting operations and bring them up to scale, a rather sophisticated mechanism has evolved. Its primary goal is to conceal Iranian shady dealings abroad, and it utilized a few types of entities to do so. The materials from the recent le
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